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Parent, Child, Husband, Wife: 
When Recognition Fails, Tragedy Ensues 
 
Scott FitzGibbon* 
 
“Dost know thy lineage? Nay, thou know’st it not, 
And all unwitting art a double foe 
To thine own kin, the living and the dead . . . .” 
 
Teiresias, in Oedipus the King1 
 
 I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Recognition, according to Aristotle’s Poetics, is one of the three 
parts of tragedy.2 Greek drama often presents an extended course of 
recognition, reflects its psychological consequences, and makes it a 
central element in the downfall of the tragic hero. That is the case, for 
example, with Oedipus. Recognition may also be a crucial stage—a 
central project—in the development of a society, and failure of recog-
nition a dimension of its deterioration. Any society, to cohere and 
flourish, must recognize, respect, and encourage the affiliational struc-
tures that weave its fabric. All fair social orders recognize the special 
character of minority groups.3 Recognition is also an element in legal 
thought, since the law must identify and define social categories and 
relationships as a basis for doctrine. The law would poorly promote 
                                                 
* J.D., Harvard. B.C.L., Oxford. Professor, Boston College Law School. Copyright 2011 by 
Scott FitzGibbon. 
1 SOPHOCLES, Oedipus the King, in SOPHOCLES 1, 41, lines 416–18 (E. Capps et al. eds., 
F. Storr trans., William Heinemann 1912) (Loeb Classical Library No. 20) [hereinafter Oedipus 
the King (Storr trans.)]. This translation places a semi-colon at the end of the lines quoted above. 
The sentence continues:  
Aye and the dogging curse of mother and sire 
One day shall drive thee, like a two-edged sword, 
Beyond our borders, and the eyes that now 
See clear shall see henceforward endless night. 
Id. at 41, lines. 418–20. 
2 See ARISTOTLE, Poetics, in II COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2316, 2324 (Jonathan 
Barnes ed., I. Baywater trans., Oxford University Press 1984) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, Poetics]. 
To be more precise, recognition is here identified as one of the three parts of the plot of tragedy. 
3 See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING 
THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) (reporting the opinion that 
“[e]veryone should be recognized for his or her unique identity”).  
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civil society if it misunderstood and mischaracterized its components. 
This article briefly notes some developments in the law and socie-
ty of our present age regarding the understanding—the recognition—of 
marriage, fatherhood, motherhood, and the family. The article warns 
against a certain casualness, a confusion, perhaps even a certain prom-
iscuity of thought, that has occasionally emerged in the law. Drawing 
on Sophocles’ drama Oedipus the King and on the scriptural narrative 
of David and Bathsheba, the article investigates what might be called 
the “moral location” of the activity of recognition. It proposes that 
recognition of basic family forms is a process with a deep dimension. 
It apprehends that failure of recognition in such matters may sow the 
seeds of social tragedy. 
 
 II.  AN INSTANCE OF CONFUSION AS TO RECOGNITION  
 
Scholars of modern family law will be able to identify many in-
stances in which recognition of basic familial roles has been occluded 
or confused, and many more in which the subject has been treated su-
perficially, as though a legislative subcommittee or a court of first im-
pression could reconstruct basic familial affiliational concepts with the 
same brisk procedures as might be otherwise applied in adjudicating or 
revising provisions of a tax code. This section lays out one example. 
Ontario law now recognizes certain people who are not married to 
one another as nevertheless spouses.4 This doctrinal misadventure has 
introduced uncertainty into the meaning of the term “spouse,” and has 
led to legal doctrines that diverge from social understandings and 
which embarrass doctrinal development, as will here be explained.  
The Ontario Family Law Act provides that “‘spouse’ . . . includes 
either of two persons who are not married to each other and have co-
habited . . . continuously for a period of not less than three years . . . 
.”5 Leading cases leave Ontario law fluid as to the meaning of the 
                                                 
4 The discussion of Ontario law in this and the following paragraphs closely follows the 
discussion in Scott FitzGibbon, “Just Like Little Dogs”: The Law Should Speak with Veracity 
and Respect, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 107, 
136–39 (Scott FitzGibbon, Lynn D. Wardle & A. Scott Loveless eds., 2010). 
5 Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, § 29 (“In this Part, . . . ‘spouse’ means a spouse 
as defined in subsection 1 (1), and in addition includes either of two persons who are not mar-
ried to each other and have cohabited, (a) continuously for a period of not less than three years, 
or (b) in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a 
child.”). Section One provides that “‘cohabit’ means to live together in a conjugal relationship, 
whether within or outside marriage” and that “‘spouse’ means either of two persons who, (a) are 
married to each other, or (b) have together entered into a marriage that is voidable or void, in 
good faith on the part of a person relying on this clause to assert any right.” 
Several other Ontario provisions define “spouse” in unusual ways, as cited and described 
in an appendix to Rosenberg v. College of Physicians and Surgeons, [2006], 216 O.A.C. 358, at 
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term “spouse.” In the case of Mahoney v. King, the court identified 
seven definitional factors, each with subparts amounting to twenty-two 
in the aggregate.6 Not included among these components was any oath 
or pledge or assurance that the parties might have made to one anoth-
er. There was no reference to a duty to love,7 honor or cherish. 
Loyalty was not specified as a requirement.8 Exclusivity was not men-
tioned. 
Ontario law has endorsed the conclusion that you can be one per-
son’s spouse at the same time that you are married to someone else. In 
Sullivan v. Letnik,9 an Ontario court held that a cohabiting couple had 
established spousal status even though one member was married to 
another person.10 In Mahoney, an Ontario court endorsed, as suffi-
ciently meritorious to go to trial, Sandra Mahoney’s assertion that she 
was her ex-lover’s “spouse,” even though he was married to another 
woman during the affair and continued throughout to live with his 
wife. The court observed that “[i]ssues relating to the definition of 
spouse are in transition.”11 
Further definitional fluidity is introduced by judicial interpretation 
of one portion of the statutory definition of “spouse,” namely, the 
phrase “cohabited . . . continuously for a period of not less than three 
years.”12 Astonishingly, a leading Ontario court has held that this does 
not require living together for three years. The court in Sullivan v. 
Letnik held that continuity of cohabitation was established across a 
                                                                                                             
app. (Ont. C.A.). 
6 [1998], 39 R.F.L. 4th 361, ¶ 6 (Can. Ont. General Div.) (citing Molodowich v. Pentti-
nen [1980], 17 R.F.L. 2d 376 (Can. Ont. Dist. Ct.)). 
7 Though one question on the court’s list was “[w]hat were their feelings towards each 
other?” Id. ¶ 6 item (ii)(c). 
8 Fidelity, however, was included, as reflected in a question: “Did they maintain an atti-
tude of fidelity to each other?” Id. ¶ 6 item (ii)(b) (under the heading “Sexual and Personal Be-
haviour.”). Note the implication that fidelity is attitudinal, rather than a matter of belief or obli-
gation.  
9 [1994] 5 R.F.L. 4th 313 (Ont. Unified Fam. Ct.), rev’d in part on other grounds, [1997] 
27 R.F.L. 4th 79 (Ont. C.A.) (applying a statute in effect prior to the Family Law Act discussed 
above). See Perkovic v. McClyment, [2008] 57 R.F.L. 6th 57 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (ascribing 
spousal status to a man who was married to someone else). The caselaw on these issues is dis-
cussed in MARY JANE MOSSMAN, FAMILIES AND THE LAW IN CANADA 510 (2004). 
10 In Mahoney, the court made this conclusion fairly explicit: 
It appears from the caselaw that parties may cohabit within the meaning of the Family 
Law Act when one party is still legally married to another. In Sullivan v. Letnik, 
Beckett found: “I am of the opinion that the parties cohabited in a conjugal relation-
ship after June 2nd, 1981, and certainly since January 2nd of 1985 when the applicant 
and her husband formally separated. The relationship was continuous from that time 
until March 1992. 
[1998] 39 R.F.L 4th ¶ 7 (internal citation omitted) (citing Letnik, [1994], 5 R.F.L. 4th ¶ 23). 
11 Mahoney, [1998] 39 R.F.L. 4th ¶ 26. 
12 Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, § 29. 
206 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 25 
 
lengthy time period when Mrs. Sullivan refused even to set foot on the 
love nest—a boat called the Jadrin—“because of the business turmoil 
between them and her fear of violence.”13 The court noted “that did 
not mean that the relationship had terminated. * * * * Whether 
couples are separated is a question of intent, not geography; at least 
one of the parties must intend to permanently sever the relationship.”14 
The fluidity of Ontario law as to the definition of “spouse” im-
pedes judgment on related matters. In Rosenberg v. College of Physi-
cians & Surgeons,15 a physician whose license was revoked owing to 
his having had sexual relations with a patient advanced as a defense 
the allegation that the patient was also his spouse. The prohibition of 
sexual relations with a patient was subject to no express spousal ex-
ception, but common sense might require that one be inferred. Surely 
the drafters did not intend to prohibit sexual relations between husband 
and wife. Dr. Rosenberg’s patient, however, was not his wife. Dr. 
Rosenberg maintained that owing to cohabitation she was nevertheless 
his spouse. The court rejected this defense, and refused to infer the 
spousal exception on the grounds that “the term ‘spouse’ has no clear 
definition in law” and that “‘spousal relationship’ means one thing in 
one context and something quite different in another,”16 so that the 
proposed exception would “open a significant hole” in the disciplinary 
requirements.17 After this decision, it remained unclear whether a phy-
sician in Ontario who afforded medical treatment to his wife (or to her 
husband) might also engage in marital sexual relations.18 
These legal provisions reflect a disorder not only of doctrine but 
                                                 
13 [1994] 5 R.F.L. 4th 313 ¶ 23. 
14 Id. ¶¶ 23–24; see also Stephen v. Stawecki,[2006], 32 R.F.L. 6th 282 (Ont. C.A.), af-
firming [2005], 32 R.F.L. 6th 273 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Sturgess v. Shaw [2002], 31 R.F.L. 5th 
453 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J); Mahoney, [1998], 39 R.F.L. 4th ¶ (“[P]arties may be found to be coha-
biting, even if they maintain separate residences.”). A further point about the Ontario definition 
of “spouse” is that by its terms it applies only to Part Three of the Family Law Act (“Support 
Obligations”). The term “spouse” is extensively used throughout the act (as of course are terms 
which would normally be cognates, such as marriage, family, and so on), but outside of Part 
Three the term “spouse” is not explicitly subject to the extended definition quoted above. It 
seems you may be a spouse for some purposes but not for others. 
15 Rosenberg v. Coll. of Physicians and Surgeons of Ont., [2006], 216 O.A.C. 358 (Ont. 
C.A.).  
16 Id. ¶ 40. The court attached an appendix that charted the varying definitions under 
twenty-six Ontario statutes and regulations.  
17 Id. ¶ 42 (characterizing the reasoning of the disciplinary committee). The court did 
leave open the possibility that some exception along those lines might later be identified, stating 
that “the legislation may leave some scope for finding that the [medical-disciplinary] . . . regime 
does not apply to certain relationships.” Id. ¶ 44. 
18 It might be doubted whether he could even touch her (or she him), or suggest making 
love at some future date, since even “touching of a sexual nature” and “behavior or remarks of a 
sexual nature” were prohibited. Id. ¶ 6.  
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also of what might be termed “legal cognition.” They are objectiona-
ble not only on the directly consequentialist ground that they may for-
bid or penalize what should be encouraged, and might encourage what 
should be forbidden, but also on the grounds that they reflect a legal 
system which, at least in some instances, “doesn’t know what it is 
talking about,” or at least neglects to think carefully and in a sustained 
way about its terminology and doctrines. They display a disorder as 
regards recognition.  
 
III.  THE NATURE OF RECOGNITION 
 
What is recognition? What is involved, for example, in recogniz-
ing one’s condition as a married man or woman; or in a society’s rec-
ognition of marriage or the parent-child relationship?19 
The Greek term is anagnôrisis. Anagnôrisis is knowledge of a sort 
that involves assessment—the exercise of judgment—the forming of a 
conclusion as to what the data really mean, what they add up to, and 
what they may import. Recognition is an achievement.  
Recognition displays two or three facets. The first is achieved by 
looking into the thing whose recognition is at issue; and the second is 
developed through looking outward or “around” the thing, determin-
ing, so to speak, where it is located—where it fits in. Recognition of a 
person, for example, has an anthropological aspect and also a social 
aspect—it entails thinking about who that person is, and indeed per-
haps what persons are, and it usually entails thinking about affiliations 
such as friendships and discerning socially recognized roles. Recogniz-
ing a person as a husband or a wife, for example, will involve identi-
fying the person and his or her history and commitments and also dep-
loying an understanding of the nature of marriage. 
 Recognition of the person may also involve a moral and a juristic 
aspect. It may call for an acknowledgment of the merits or demerits of 
the person’s way of life, an identification of his social or legal location 
as an honorable person or a miscreant, and an identification of the 
person’s special roles and of the goods which those roles serve or neg-
                                                 
19 There is an interesting discussion of various senses of “recognition” in chapter two of 
PATHCEN MARKELL, BOUND BY RECOGNITION (2003), but none of the major meanings there 
identified fully corresponds to the meaning developed here. For example, the account here is not 
limited to retrieved knowledge, as when one recognizes a friend: Oedipus does not retrieve old 
knowledge when he recognizes that he has killed his father. Further, the account here is not li-
mited to knowledge that implies respect: although the term recognition, as in the phrase “public 
recognition,” often does imply respect, this is not always the case (certainly Oedipus’ self-
recognition did not enhance his self-respect). Further, the account presented in this article is not 
about recognition in a performative sense, as when the chair recognizes a speaker.  
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lect. In tragic drama, it may involve a recognition of the incipience of 
retribution, as when Macbeth recognizes the fulfillment of prophecy 
when he hears that Birnam Wood is moving towards Dunsinane. 
Altogether, recognition is a fairly complex project, and sometimes 
a deep one. Recognition is accomplished when the person arrives at a 
settled acknowledgment of the situation by adducing his wisdom: his 
accumulated, settled insights into how things are, how they are re-
lated, and how they are to be understood.  
Recognition takes on a special character when one’s self—the re-
cognizing person—is the person to be recognized. The project then in-
volves the self in a special way (we might call it “reflexive recogni-
tion”). As with other forms of recognition, this sort often involves 
recognition of relationships. It rests upon judgments as to “where one 
belongs” or “what one belongs to” or, more importantly still, whom 
one belongs to (family and country, for example). Furthermore, rec-
ognition of self entails recognition of where one stands morally. This 
is the case, for example, when one recognizes one’s duties as a hus-
band or wife, or when one recognizes one’s parents and the obliga-
tions one has to them. In all such projects, reflexive recognition can 
plumb the depths of the heart. It may involve, as Aristotle states in the 
Poetics, “a change from ignorance to awareness of a bond of love or 
hate.”20 
 As all of this may suggest, the most difficult, the darkest, the most 
tragic projects are those which lead to recognition of the self as moral-
ly flawed and as complicit in flawed affiliations, especially those of a 
familial or pseudo-familial nature. 
 
IV.  THE TRAGEDY OF OEDIPUS THE KING 
 
 The classic recognition episode in Greek tragedy unfolds in Oedi-
pus the King, as Oedipus gradually realizes, to his horror, that the 
man he killed some years previously in a conflict at a crossroads was 
in fact his own father, Laius, and that the woman he subsequently 
married was also his own mother, Jocasta. The story is familiar: King 
Laius, frightened by a prophecy that he would one day be slain by his 
own son, sought the death of Oedipus in infancy; and Oedipus was 
therefore given over to die by exposure to the elements, abandoned on 
a mountain with his feet pinioned together. Rescued, Oedipus was 
raised by the king and queen of another country—Polybus and his 
wife—who concealed the fact that they were not his biological parents. 
                                                 
20 ARISTOTLE, Poetics, supra note 2, at 2324. 
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When he grew older, Oedipus heard a prophecy that he was des-
tined to kill his own father. Fleeing the kingdom to avoid this fate, he 
met a stranger at a crossroads—a stranger who was in fact his father, 
Laius, although Oedipus did not recognize him. (How could he have 
done? Any stranger might have been his father.).  In a brawl, Oedipus 
killed this stranger, fulfilling part of the prophecy. As events then un-
folded, he married Jocasta, although again Oedipus did not, of course, 
recognize her as his mother. (How could he have done? Any woman 
could have been his mother.). 
All of this sets the scene for the horrible events which bring the 
tragic truth to light, as the prophet Teiresias, a messenger, and then a 
shepherd divulge piecemeal the events of Oedipus’ family history, 
gradually making them evident despite Oedipus’ resistance and his ef-
forts to confabulate alternate interpretations.  
 The extreme power of this drama—the awe and horror that it 
evokes in every age, including our own—calls for some explaining. 
After all, how likely is it that similar events could occur today? Our 
contemporaries do not practice infanticide, nor do they expose their 
infants or hand them over to nameless shepherds, and thus do not risk 
the unexpected survival into adulthood of a child ignorant of his bio-
logical origins—not for precisely the reasons that applied in Oedipus’ 
case anyway, though abortion is widely practiced in modern society. 
A modern Sophocles might pen the drama of a baby who survives a 
late-term abortion, and unbeknownst to the mother, is rescued by a 
merciful nurse, is placed for adoption through a pregnancy help shel-
ter, and is raised by an adopting couple who conceal the fact that they 
are not the biological parents. Alternatively, this playwright might de-
pict the case of someone whose biological mother has used the servic-
es of a surrogate to bear the child to maturity and then refused to ac-
cept the child as her own, concealing her identity thereafter, as the 
confidentiality laws of some jurisdictions would permit. 
Further modern parallels are suggested by the generation-crossing 
confusions in Oedipus’ family. Jocasta’s children with Oedipus were 
also her grandchildren. Oedipus’ children with Jocasta were also his 
half-brothers and half-sisters.21 Professor Margaret Somerville has re-
cently reported a Canadian case in which the grandmother of a baby 
was also its mother: she was the biological grandmother and also be-
                                                 
21 See SOPHOCLES, Oedipus the King, in SOPHOCLES: THE THEBAN PLAYS 1, 21 lines 
455–58 (David Grenetrans., 1994) [hereinafter Oedipus the King (Grene trans.)]: 
  He shall be proved father and brother both 
  To his own children in his house, to her 
  that gave him birth, a son and husband both . . . . 
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came, because she assisted her daughter’s pregnancy by carrying the 
embryo to term, the surrogate mother.22 
Oedipus the King is a drama about unfolding knowledge.23 It re-
flects that familiar, deeply human experience which leads beyond cur-
rent developments and brings to light the clues to the hidden past.24 It 
is a drama about how the search for knowledge can be distorted and 
how it can miscarry. 
Oedipus the King is also a tragedy of ignorance of family. It is a 
tragedy of nonrecognition of fundamental familial relationships. The 
“recognition tragedy” of Oedipus unfolds because of the disordered 
condition of his birth family, the disruption of the natural evolution of 
familial recognition, and the rupture, owing to his abandonment by 
Laius and Jocasta, of the natural development of the relationship be-
tween parent and child. It is this circumstance that is the basis for the 
question posed to Oedipus by the prophet Teiresias quoted at the be-
ginning of this article: 
 
Dost know thy lineage? Nay, thou know’st it not,  
And all unwitting art a double foe  
To thine own kin, the living and the dead.25 
 
 It is owing to our being acknowledged by our parents, kept by our 
parents, and raised by our parents, that we recognize our parents. This 
recognition is founded on their being recognizable: in other words, be-
ing members of a category (mother, father, parent) whose borders 
have not been hopelessly blurred. 
 It is owing to practices of familial recognition that we learn the art 
of recognition. Family life: its intimacy across the years, the oppor-
tunities it affords for candid discussion and for the observation of the 
unfolding effects of speech and action—sustains, as no other circums-
tances can, conditions conducive to the most comprehensive sorts of 
                                                 
22 Margaret Somerville, When Granny Gives Birth to Her Grandson, Something’s Wrong, 
GLOBE & MAIL, available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/opinion/when-
granny-gives-birth-to-her-grandson-theres-something-wrong/article1913695/ (last visited Feb. 22, 
2011). 
23 Cf. Charles Segal, Introduction to Oedipus the King, in SOPHOCLES: THE THEBAN 
PLAYS xi, xxiii (David Grene trans., 1994), supra (noting various puns and double entendres on 
Oedipus’ name, several of which involve the term “know” and cognates). 
24 See Charles Segal, Life’s Tragic Shape: Plot, Design, and Destiny, in BLOOM’S 
MODERN CRITICAL INTERPRETATIONS: SOPHOCLES’ OEDIPUS REX 205, 213 (Harold Bloom ed., 
updated ed. 2007) (“The Oedipus is almost unique among Greek tragedies in telling its story in 
reverse. Nearly every crucial event in the action has already happened. The action is therefore 
almost all retrospective action – that is, it depicts how the characters (and the spectators too) see 
and understand in the present events that took place in the past.”). 
25 Oedipus the King (Storr trans.), supra note 1, at 41, lines 417–20. 
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recognition. In our parents’ eyes we better recognize ourselves, day 
by day. In family life, we initiate the continuous review of self which 
is thereafter sustained by thoughtful persons throughout their lives. 
The faculties of reason that underlie recognition—memory, discern-
ment and judgment—take root and grow first in that seedbed of the 
cognitive virtues. 
 In Oedipus the King, Sophocles places his hands upon cords which 
wind into the very heart of the human condition. First, he touches 
upon the sacrality of the family bond. The tragedy of Oedipus reflects 
the circumstance that family and familial recognition make us what we 
are. Oedipus the King also portrays the curses of familial failure—or, 
putting the matter in a more modern way, the lasting, lifelong, trans-
generational effects (sometimes even the fatal effects) that ensue when 
familial bonds are disrupted, distorted or corrupted. 
 
V.  RESPONSES AND REACTIONS TO OCCASIONS FOR TRAGIC 
RECOGNITION 
 
 What may be the alternatives available to one who is gradually 
confronted by the unfolding of a tale that invites unpleasant recogni-
tion, especially recognition of one’s self in one’s most intimate, fa-
milial affiliations? What might ensue when recognition may embrace 
the sad, the delictual, the bad, and the disgraceful? What follows upon 
that which is termed, in Oedipus the King, the “terrible speech . . . 
[the] terrible hearing?”26 
 I present two alternatives: some people face it, and some refuse to 
face it. Some people apprehend the truth as it comes to light, clearly 
discern its unwelcome implications as they unfold, and unflinchingly 
acknowledge the conclusions that inevitably must be drawn. So also do 
some societies and their legal systems face the unpleasant facts. Other 
people and societies evasively seek ignorance or, if necessary, go so 
far as to blind themselves to the truth. 
 The first line of response is exemplified by King David, who has 
(like Oedipus) committed a dreadful contravention of the laws of con-
jugal morality, and who also is made to listen to terrible words: 
 
                                                 
26 Oedipus the King (Grene trans.), supra note 21, at 50, lines 1169–70: 
“HERDSMAN: O God, I am on the brink of frightful speech. 
“OEDIPUS: And I of frightful hearing, But I must hear.” 
The Greek here translated “frightful” is “δευνω,” and can be translated “terrible,” which 
is why that word is used in the text, supra. 
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Late one afternoon, David rose from his couch and strolled on the 
roof of the royal palace; and from the roof he saw a woman bathing. 
The woman was very beautiful, and the king sent someone to make 
inquiries about the woman. He reported, “She is Bathsheba daughter 
of Eliam [and] wife of Uriah the Hittite.” David sent messengers to 
fetch her; she came to him and he lay with her. . . . 
 
 David wrote a letter to Joab . . . as follows: “Place Uriah in the 
front line where the fighting is fiercest; then fall back so that he may 
be killed.” So . . . Joab . . . stationed Uriah at the point where he 
knew that there were able warriors. The men of the city sallied out 
and attacked . . . Uriah the Hittite was among those who died.  
 
 . . . .  
 
 But the LORD was displeased with what David had done, and the 
LORD sent Nathan to David. He came to him and said, “There were 
two men in the same city, one rich and one poor. The rich man had 
very large flocks and herds, but the poor man had only one little 
ewe lamb that he had bought. He tended it and it grew up together 
with him and his children: it used to share his morsel of bread, drink 
from his cup, and nestle in his bosom; it was like a daughter to him. 
One day, a traveler came to the rich man, but he was loath to take 
anything from his own flocks or herds to prepare a meal for the 
guest who had come to him; so he took the poor man’s lamb and 
prepared it for the man who had come to him.” 
 
 David flew into a rage against the man, and said to Nathan, “As 
the LORD lives, the man who did this deserves to die! He shall pay 
for the lamb four times over, because he did such a thing and 
showed no pity.” And Nathan said to David, “That man is you!”27  
 
This last, dreadful pronouncement bears some distant likeness to a 
statement uttered by Teiresias to Oedipus: 
  
 I say you are the murderer of the king 
 Whose murderer you seek.28 
 
It springs the trap. 
 
David and Oedipus are both kings. Each presides, as he believes, 
over an inquiry into a severe wrong. Each, when the trap springs, is 
                                                 
27 2 Samuel 11:2–12:7 (The Jewish Study Bible, 2004). 
28 Oedipus the King (Grene trans.), supra note 21, at 35, lines 362–63. 
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obliged to identify himself as the culprit he seeks. David and Oedipus 
respond in different ways, however, and can therefore serve as illu-
strations of two alternate roads that may be followed after such a dis-
covery.  
 
A.  The Davidic Response 
 
 David admits his guilt.29 He offers no excuses and in no way ob-
scures or distorts the insight that Nathan has demanded of him. The 
Lord punishes him with the mortal illness of his son. David fasts, 
weeps, prays, and deeply repents. The child dies. David seeks confir-
mation of his son’s death. Having acknowledged his sin, he can rec-
ognize this as his just punishment. He ceases to fast and goes on with 
his life.30 He is thoroughly realistic. He recognizes the situation for 
what it is. 
 David’s recognition has social and political aspects. When the 
child dies, the servants fear to reveal it.31 David insists on learning the 
truth. He asks; they tell him.32 David insists on recognizing the truth 
when others would connive at concealing it.When David ceases to 
fast, his courtiers ask for an explanation and he gives one: 
 
While the child was still alive, I fasted and wept because I thought: 
“Who knows? The LORD may have pity on me, and the child may 
live! But now that he is dead, why should I fast? Can I bring him 
back again? I shall go to him, but he can never come back to me.”33 
 
David emerges as one who, as great heads of state in crises often 
do, depicts the course and culmination of a crisis with bold strokes, 
encouraging and promoting clarity of recognition. David goes even 
further than most of the great and displays recognition of his own me-
rited distress. Such a leader promotes, in his nation, practices of hon-
est and clear social recognition. He promotes—as do the Davidic 
Psalms—appreciation of the law. 
 
                                                 
29 2 Samuel 12:13 (The Jewish Study Bible, 2004) (“David said to Nathan: ‘I stand guilty 
before the Lord!’”). The notes to this edition of the Bible invite the reader to compare the eva-
sive comments of Saul when Samuel convicts him of disobedience to the Lord in 1 Samuel 15.  
30 The narrative in this paragraph is based on 2 Samuel 12:13–23 (Jewish Study Bible, 
2004). 
31 Id. at 12:18 (“‘[H]ow can we tell him that the child is dead? He might do something 
terrible.’”). 
32 Id. at 12:19. 
33 Id. at 12:22. 
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B.  The Oedipal Response 
 
 The second line of response to an occasion for recognition—to the 
“terrible speech” and the “terrible hearing”—may be exemplified by 
Oedipus, who (after evasive strategies designed to deflect knowledge 
of the awful truth) cannot bear what comes into view. He blinds him-
self. The deepest horror of the tragedy of Oedipus lies not in his un-
knowing attack on his own family, but rather in his attack on him-
self—his attack on his own ability or willingness to see and 
understand—his attack on recognition itself. 
Oedipus’ responses, like David’s, have social and political aspects. 
As did David, so does Oedipus encounter discouragement and resis-
tance from those who think it better that he not learn the truth.  Teire-
sias and the Old Shepherd must have the facts dragged out of them. 
Jocasta, in what are almost her last words to Oedipus, promotes exis-
tential ignorance: “mayst thou ne’er discover who thou art!”34 
Oedipus blinds himself—according to one interpretation—so that in 
the next world, when he encounters Laius and Jocasta in the Stygian 
fields, he will not have to bear the sight of their horrified gaze.35 He 
cannot bear their recognition of the circumstances any more than he 
can tolerate his own. He asks Creon to banish him to a place where 
no one will ever speak to him again.36 The avoidance of recognition is 
a widespread policy of those in Oedipus’s Thebes and, unlike David, 
Oedipus promotes this doomed effort for a long time. 
 
C.  Social and Legal Responses 
 
The position of a disordered society before the law can rightly be 
compared to the position of David before Nathan or Oedipus before 
Teiresias. A society, like a king, may be confronted with the occasion 
for reflexive recognition with likely unpleasant results, and may, simi-
larly, be required to choose between two alternatives. One alternative 
is to face up to the situation, like David; the other is to deny, avoid or 
in some other way escape the intolerable gaze of familial authority and 
the pronouncements of law. A disordered society that persists in 
                                                 
34 Oedipus the King (Storr trans.), supra note 1, at 99, line 1069. 
35 See id. at 125, lines 1373–75, in which Oedipus states: 
“. . . [H]ad I sight, I know not with what eyes 
I could have met my father in the shades, 
Or my poor mother . . . .” 
36 See Oedipus the King (Grene trans.), supra note 21, at 59, line 1437 (“to where I may 
not hear a human voice.”). 
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shameful practices will inevitably seek a course that seems to achieve 
the latter results. 
 Of course society has no physical eyes to put out, nor can it seek 
the sentence of banishment to some foreign lands. It can, however, 
metaphorically put out its own eyes and deafen its ears by diminishing 
its capacity to see the truth clearly and by refusing to listen. It can 
suppress those who would display the truth and distort the language 
and linguistic practices of those who might report it. It may, for ex-
ample, define the terms used in its statutes and judicial authorities to 
the point of incoherence. 
 A miscreant who is a private individual, or but one official, may 
think it necessary to flee the law and its oracles; but miscreants who 
are themselves the guardians of the social order—the parents and the 
judges: the keepers of the law—seem to have the power to evade rec-
ognition by distorting the law itself. They may, with tragic results, in-
terfere with the, so to speak, seriousness or gravitas of legal dis-
course—with the firmness of the law, the discernment of the law, the 
vocabulary or the terminology of the law, what we might almost term 
the “eyes” of the law—and thus with the law’s capacity for recogni-
tion.

  
 
